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JURISDICTION OF NAVAL COURTS
MARTIAL OVER CIVILIANS*
A. The Problem
The permissible scope of court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians has long been a vague and uncertain matter which
has been the subject of controversy inside and outside of
the armed forces. A basic principle which aids in the solu-
tion of this problem was clearly enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in the recent case of Hirshberg v.
Cooke.' This principle, which many constitutional lawyers
thought obvious, states that courts martial have only such
jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by law, and that this
jurisdiction cannot be altered or enlarged by the executive
branch of the government. Specifically, the Supreme
Court unanimously decided the Navy could not lawfully
try an enlisted man for a non-fraudulent offense committed
in a prior enlistment from which he had been honorably
discharged, despite regulations of the Secretary of the Navy
purporting to make such trial lawful, for the simple reason
that Congress had not conferred such jurisdiction upon na-
val courts martial. It remains to be determined how far
Congress can constitutionally go in conferring jurisdiction
on courts martial, particularly with respect to civilians. And
within this undefined limit it becomes a practical question
as to how far Congress needs to go in order to cope with
situations which might be expected .to arise in a jet-propelled
age.
*The opinions or assertions contained in this article are the private ones of
the author and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of
the Department of the Navy or of the naval service at large. The author held
the position of chief of the military law division of the Navy 1945-46, and was
retired at his own request after 27 years of continuous active service. He is a
brigadier general on the retired list of the U. S. Marine Corps and is now teaching
law at the University of San Francisco, California.
1 ....U. .., 69 S. Ct. 530 (1949).
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B. The Sources of Power
Naval courts martial of the United States have only such
jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by law. That law is
the supreme law of the United States, which consists of the
Constitution, the laws made in pursuance thereof, and the
treaties made under the authority of the United States.' It
has been said that naval courts martial have only such juris-
diction as is conferred by statute," but this is not strictly
true today. Jurisdiction over prisoners of war has been
conferred by treaty,' without the interposition of statute.
It has, however, been correctly said that courts martial are
courts of special and limited jurisdiction ' and not courts of
general criminal jurisdiction.'
The power of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon naval
courts martial is derived from its express constitutional
powers to provide and maintain a navy, to make rules for
the government of the naval forces, and to make all laws
2 U. S. Const. Art. VI.
8 McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49, 63, 22 S. Ct. 786, 46 L. Ed. 1040
(1902); Ex parte Wilson, 33 F. (2d) 214 (E. D. Va. 1929); U. S. ex rel. Romero
v. Squier, 133 F. (2d) 528 (C.C.A. 9th 1943), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 785, 63 S.
Ct. 982, 87 L. Ed. 1152 (1943); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. Va.
1943); Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F. (2d) 745 (C.C.A. 10th 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 800, 65 S. Ct. 552, 89 L. Ed. 638 (1945), rehearing denied, 324 U. S. 888,
65 S. Ct. 863, 89 L. Ed. 1436 (1945), rehearing denied, 326 U. S. 806, 66 S. Ct.
8, 90 L. Ed. 491 (1945); Rosborough v. Rossell, 150 F. (2d) 809 (C.CA. 1st
1945).
4 International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
signed at Geneva, Switzerland, July 27, 1929, Art. 63 of which provides that
"Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the same courts
and according to the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the
armed forces of the detaining Power." (Translation from 47 STAr. 2021 (1929);
TREATY SE.=s No. 846; IV MALLOY, TREATrm 5224.
5 Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 209, 7 L. Ed. 650 (U. S. 1830); Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331, 2 L. Ed. 457 (U. S. 1806); Mills v. Martin, 19 Johns. 7
(N. Y. 1821); Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 7 S. Ct. 1141, 30 L. Ed.
1167 (1887); Swaim v. United States, 165 U. S. 553, 17 S. Ct. 448, 41 L. Ed. 823
(1897); United States ex rel. Viscardi v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 695, 754 (E. D. N.
Y. 1920), app. dis. sub. nom. Wessels v. United States, 256 U. S. 705, 41 S. Ct.
535, 65 L. Ed. 1180 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 41 S. Ct. 227, 65 L.
Ed. 475 (1921); Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416, 418, 42 S. Ct. 326, 66 L. Ed.
692 (1922) ; In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. Ohio 1944).
0 16 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 578 (1880). See People v. Wendel, 59 Misc. 354, 112
N.Y.S. 301, 302 (1908).
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necessary and proper for carrying into execution the fore-
going powers2. In conferring jurisdiction, Congress may in-
clude offenses against the law of nations.' The power to
confer jurisdiction over persons is not, however, unrestrict-
ed. It is recognized in and limited by the exception in the
Fifth Amendment to the requirement of presentment or in-
dictment by a grand jury "in cases arising in the land or
naval forces." I This same exception has been held, by
judicial construction, applicable to the requirement in the
Sixth Amendment of a jury trial in all criminal prosecu-
tions.10
The civilian may find himself subjected to naval jurisdic-
tion in four situations: (1) under martial law arising from
necessity in time of war or great public danger when the
civil courts are unable to fulfill their functions; (2) under
military government of occupied territories; (3) under the
international law of war; (4) under naval law, including
the Articles for the Government of the Navy. The prob-
lems discussed in this article fall within the last named
category, in which only courts martial, as distinguished from
extraordinary military tribunals like the military commis-
sion, are involved.
C. The Exercise of Power
Congress, in the exercise of its powers, has enacted legis-
lation which brings within the jurisdiction of naval courts
martial four classes of civilians. The first class includes
7 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 13, 14 and 18.
8 Id., cl. 10.
9 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces . ...1
10 EX parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 6349 (C.C. Ky. 1878); Ex
parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123, 138, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U. S. 1866). The proposed
Uniform Code of Military Justice specifically provides that a dismissed officer
making application for trial "shall be held to have waived the right to plead any
statute of limitations applicable" but fails to make any similar statement respecting
a waiver of his rights to a grand jury indictment and to a jury trial. H.R. 2498,
§ 1, Art. 4.
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persons found as spies, carriers of seducing messages from
an enemy, and incitors of disloyalty. The second class in-
cludes persons accompanying or serving with naval forces,
and persons in leased areas under naval control, beyond the
reach of the federal courts. The third class is composed of
officers dismissed by the President in time of war who de-
mand trial. The fourth class is composed of discharged or
dismissed members of the naval service subsequently
charged with having committed, while in the service, certain
pecuniary frauds against the government.
There is a fifth class, not expressly provided for by statute,
over which naval authorities assert jurisdiction. This class
is composed of discharged members of the naval service sub-
sequently charged with having obtained their discharges by
fraud. The class differs from the first four mentioned in that
the status of civilian admittedly attaches to the persons of
the first four classes, whereas the status of the persons of the
fifth class is contested.
Jurisdiction over the first class is contained in the fifth
article of the Articles for the Government of the Navy
(hereafter cited as AGN). It reads:
All persons who, in time of war, or of rebellion against
the supreme authority of the United States come or are found
in the. capacity of spies or who bring or deliver any seducing
letter or message from an enemy or rebel or endeavor to cor-
rupt any person in the Navy to betray his trust, shall suffer
death, or such other punishment as a court-martial may ad-
judge.
The article covers "all persons," and civilians as twell as
others are included.12 Those who are found as spies are
punishable under the law of war by the extraordinary mili-
tary tribunals recognized by that law.1" Those who bring
11 Rxv. STAT. § 1624 Art. 5 (1875), 34 U.S.C. § 1200 Art. 5 (1946).
12 See ScnuILa, MLImARY LAW AND DETENSE LsoIsLTiON 506 (1941); U. S.
ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (E. D. N. Y. 1920), app. dis. 256 U. S.
705, 41 S. Ct. 535, 65 L. Ed. 1180 (1921).
1 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. Ed. 537 (U. S. 1827); U. S. ex. rel.
Wessels v. McDonald, supra note 12; Halleck, Military Espionage, 5 Am. J. INT.
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seducing messages from an enemy, and those who endeavor
to corrupt naval personnel to betray their trust have com-
mitted offenses which are generally recognized by the law
of war under the heading of "war treason." "4 Such offenses
are triable by extraordinary military tribunals. Naval
courts martial have jurisdiction over civilians charged with
these offenses only by virtue of the statutory authority
quoted above,"5 and this jurisdiction attaches when such
offenders are formally charged with having committed one
or more of these offenses."6 It is immaterial that prior to
being so charged, the accused was not subject to naval law.
Violators of the law of war are not within the protection of
the Constitution, were not intended to be so protected at
the time the Constitution was adopted, and therefore have
no right to a jury trial.' Under the proposed Uniform Code
of Military Justice, prepared under the direction of and ap-
proved by the Secretary of Defense, and on February 8,
1949, introduced into the 81st Congress, as H.R. 2498, de-
signed to unify, consolidate, revise, and codify the criminal
law of the armed forces, this class was included in a broad
jurisdiction conferred upon courts martial to try any per-
son who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal."'
Jurisdiction over the second class is contained in the Act
of March 22, 1943.9 It reads:
L. 590, 591 (1911); McKinney, Spies and Traitors, 12 ILL. L. REv. 591, 598-601
(1918). See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 30-31, 63 S. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).
14 Although not mentioned in the Hague Rules. 2 OsPPENmir, IwTERNATIoNAL
LAW 331-332 and 457 (6th ed., Lauterpacht, 1944).
15 U. S. ex rel. Wesels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (E. D. N. Y. 1920), app.
dis. 256 U. S. 705, 41 S. Ct. 535, 65 L. Ed. 1180 (1921). Cf. CLARK AND MARSHALL,
LAW o CRIME § 484 (4th ed. 1940).
16 See U. S. ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, supra note 15.
17 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 40-45, 63 S. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).
18 Uniform Code, Art. 18. This jurisdiction had already been given to the
Army (AW 12) but never to the Navy. A penal article relating to spies is in-
cluded in the Uniform Code, Art. 106. A modified version of the Uniform Code
was introduced on April 7, 1949, as H. R. 4080 by Mr. Brooks, a member of the
House Committee on Armed Services.
19 57 STAT. 41 (1943), 34 1-. S. C. § 1201 (1946). Because a technical state of
war still exists, this provision was rendered inapplicable from July 25, 1947, until
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In addition to the persons now subject to the Articles for
the Government of the Navy, all persons, other than persons
in the military service of the United States, outside the conti-
nental limits of the United States accompanying or serving
with the United States Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast
Guard when serving as a part of the Navy, including but not
limited to persons employed by the Government directly, or
by contractors or subcontractors engaged in naval projects,
and all persons, other than persons in the military service of
the United States, within an area leased by the United States
which is without the territorial jurisdiction thereof and which
is under the control of the Secretary of the Navy, shall, in
time of war or national emergency, be subject to the Articles
for the Government of the Navy except insofar as these ar-
ticles define offenses of such a nature that they can be com-
mitted only by naval personnel: Provided, That the jurisdic-
tion herein conferred shall not extend to Alaska, the Canal
Zone, the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Is-
lands, except the islands of Palmyra, Midway, Johnston, and
that part of the Aleutian Islands west of longitude one hun-
dred and seventy-two degrees west.
It will be noted that since the personnel of the Army are
excluded, and the persons included are in addition to naval
personnel, this statute is aimed directly at civilians. It sub-
jects to AGN in war or national emergency two classes: (1)
civilians accompanying or serving with naval forces in
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of existing federal
courts; and (2) civilians physically within leased naval
bases which are outside the territorial jurisdiction of exist-
ing federal courts. The power of Congress thus to subject
such civilians to the jurisdiction of courts martial depends
primarily upon whether such civilians have a constitutional
right to trial by jury. The power of a court martial to try
such a civilian further depends upon his status and the juris-
diction conferred over his person and over the particular
act of omission charged. These questions will be discus-
the official end of World War II by Senate Joint Resolution 123, Pub. L. No. 239,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25, 1947), which by § 3 makes that date the date of
termination of the war and national emergencies so far as this provision and 107
other statutory provisions are concerned. This action indicated that it was the
sense of Congress that such jurisdiction over civilians should not be exercised
after all hostilities had ceased.
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sed later. The proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice
extends jurisdiction over this second class of civilians by
failing to restrict it to times of war or national emergency.2"
Jurisdiction over the third class is contained in AGN 3 7.21
The pertinent part of the article provides:
When any officer, dismissed by order of the President,
makes, in writing, an application for trial, setting forth, un-
der oath that he has been wrongfully dismissed, the President
shall, as soon as the necessities of the service may permit,
convene a court martial to try such officer on the charges on
which he shall have been dismissed. And if such court mar-
tial shall not be convened within six months from the presen-
tation of such application for trial, or if such court, being
convened, shall not award dismissal or death as the punish-
ment of such officer, the order of dismissal by the President
shall be void ....
This provision covers a class of civilians, since officers dis-
missed in time of war by order of the President are no long-
er in the naval service.2 It apparently contemplates for-
mer commissioned officers, because the laws prohibiting
the dismissal of an officer except by general court martial
or in time of war by order of the President * have been
held not to apply to warrant officers.24 The court-martial
jurisdiction over the persons of such dismissed officers was
conferred subject to the application of such former officers
for trial, and not against their will. The question of the
power of Congress to confer such jurisdiction depends upon
the right of a civilian to waive the guaranty of a jury trial
in a criminal prosecution. This question will be discussed
20 H. R. 2498, § 1, Art. 2 (11) and 2 (12).
21 REV. STAT. § 1624 Art. 37 (1875), 34 U.S.C. § 1200 Art. 37 (1946). The
Army views the similar provision in Rxv. STAT. § 1230 (1875), 10 U. S. C. § 573
(1946), inoperative as to the Army, citing Wallace v. United States, 55 Ct. CI. 396
(1920), aff'd. 257 U. S. 541, 42 S. Ct. 221, 66 L. Ed. 360 (1922), for the proposi-
tion that the enactment of AW 118 in 1916 had that effect. DIG;EsT, JAG ARM Y
82-3 (1912-40).
22 See United States v. Corson, 114 U. S. 619, 5 S. Ct. 1158, 29 L. Ed. 254
(185); Wallace v. United States, supra note 21.
28 REv. STAT. § 1229 and 1624 (1875); Act of April 2, 1918, c. 39, 40 STAT.
501 (1918), 34 U. S. C. § 1200 Art. 36 (1946).
24 See DIGEST, JAG ARMY 49 (1922).
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later. The proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice re-
tains jurisdiction over this third class of civilians.2
Jurisdiction over the fourth class is contained in AGN
14.2" That article recites and makes punishable certain
frauds by naval personnel against the government, relating
to claims against the United States or to the security of
public property. These are substantially the same crimes
now provided for by the Federal Criminal Code." Then
follows a general provision covering naval personnel who
execute, attempt, or countenance "any other fraud" against
the United States. The word "other" has been held, in re-
liance upon firmly established rules of statutory construc-
tion,28 to restrict the application of the provision to frauds
of like nature to those enumerated in the preceding para-
graphs.29 Finally, there is a provision (11th paragraph)
which subjects to trial by court martial an alleged offender
against AGN 14 after he had been separated from the naval
service. It reads: So
And if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses
described in this article while in the naval service, receives
his discharge, or is dismissed from the service, he shall con-
tinue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sent-
enced by a court martial, in the same manner and to the
same extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been
dismissed.
25 H.R. 2498§ 1, Art. 4.
26 REV. STAT. § 1624 Art. 14 (1875)1 34 U. S. C. § 1200 Art. 14 (1946).
27 40 STAT. 1015 (1918), U. S. CODE CONG. SERV., Unbound Title 18 U. S. C.
§§ 286, 287, 641, 1001, 1022-1024, 1361 (1948).
28 The rule of ejusdem generis, sometimes called Lord Tenterden's rule. Chap-
man v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202, 208, 11 L. Ed. 236 (U. S. 1884); United States v.
Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 390, 4 L. Ed. 404 (U. S. 1818); 2 SuTH.E AND, STATUTORY
CoNstRucroN § 4909 (3rd ed. 1943).
29 190 CMO 24 (1918) (Navy court-martial orders).
80 The same provision is made for the military service by Article of War 94,
the origin and theory of which is to be found in the congressional debates printed
in the CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 952-58 (1863). The original statute of
March 2, 1863, was a war measure apparently intended to be but temporary in its
operation (DAvis, MmiTARY LAW OF THE UN='w STATES 456n, (3d ed. 1913)), and
was inadvertently or blindly allowed to remiin on the statute books in the com-
pilation of the Revised Statutes in 1874. WwNTiRop, M=srARY LAW AND PRECE-
DENTS 105 (2nd ed. 1896, reprinted 1920). For the Army, however, it was re-
enacted in 1916 and 1920.
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The word "guilty" is not used in its strict sense, but means,
in effect, "charged with." 11 Since by its express terms, this
paragraph is limited to offenses committed while the ac-
cused was in the naval service, a court martial would have,
within the period of the statute of limitations, jurisdiction
over the particular act or omission charged. The dispute
revolves around the jurisdiction over the person of the ac-
cused. The language of the statute tacitly admits the va-
lidity of the discharge or dismissal. But such a discharge
or dismissal may operate as a severance of all connection
with the naval service, and in that event the Navy ordinar-
ily loses jurisdiction over the person.32 The jurisdiction
conferred is based upon the theory that the case arose in the
naval forces, that therefore the guaranty of a jury trial does
not apply to such a person, and that trial by court martial
is necessary and proper. The interpretation as to when a
case arises and the evaluation of the practical necessity of
trial by court martial are determinative of the jurisdictional
problem. This will be discussed later. The proposed Uni-
form Code of Military Justice revises and rearranges in a
shorter, more intelligible form the non-repetitious provisions
of the substantive fraudulent offenses, but it wisely omits
entirely the continuing jurisdiction clause above quoted."3
Jurisdiction over the fifth class, that of discharged per-
sons subsequently charged with having obtained their dis-
charges by "fraud," is not expressly mentioned in AGN or
other naval law. The offense does not fall under "any other
fraud" covered by AGN 14, because this phrase refers to
offenses of similar nature (pecuniary) to those previously
enumerated in that article, 4 and a misrepresentation which
31 U. S. ex rel. Marino v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E. D. N. Y. 1945), in-
terpreting identical language in AW 94.
32 United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, ....U. S....., 69 S. Ct. 536 (1949).
33 H. R. 2498, § 1, Art. 132. The reason given for the omission was that
the offenses are covered by the general criminal statutes and that discharged and
dismissed persons are subject to prosecution in the federal courts for their viola-
tion.
34 Notes 28 and 29 supra.
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induces the issuance of a discharge does not constitute the
technical offense of fraud. Like the offenses covered by
AGN 14, however, the alleged "fraud" in obtaining a dis-
charge must perforce have been committed while the ac-
cused was in the naval service. If conduct of this nature is
punishable under the statutory authority of naval law, a
court martial has jurisdiction over the particular act or
omission allegedly committed. Even if it could be said that
the case arose in the naval forces, which would leave to Con-
gress the power to bring it within court-martial jurisdiction,
nevertheless Congress has not given to naval courts martial
jurisdiction over such discharged persons. The discharge,
if valid, operates to sever the person's connection with the
naval service. So long as that connection remains severed,
and so long as the discharge stands unrevoked, the person is
a civilian and beyond currently effective naval jurisdiction.
If the discharge is revoked or nullified by the orderly pro-
cesses of law, the status of the person as a member of the
naval service may be said never to have been legally chang-
ed. The dispute concerns his current status, and his status
is determinative of jurisdiction. This question will be dis-
cussed later. The proposed Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice provides a method for judicially resolving the question
of status, by specifically conferring upon courts martial the
power to try such an alleged offender and, in effect, restrict-
ing the issue to be tried to that of the accused's status.8 5
Outside of the classes mentioned, the only power which
a naval court martial can exercise over civilians is that given
by the statutory authority to issue a warrant of attachment
and to have a civilian arrested in order to assure his pres-
ence as a witness.' The contempt power over civilians not
subject to naval law is incomplete, amounting only to a pre-
85 H.R. 2498, § 1, Art. 3 (b).
86 AGN 42(b), which grants a power derived from Rav. STAT. § 881 (1875),
28 U. S. C. § 6$9 (1946).
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liminary finding of the fact of contempt, the final adjudica-
tion and the power of punishment resting with the federal
courts. 7
D. Scope and Effect of the Right to Jury Trial
The right to a jury trial is not world-wide in its territor-
ial scope. It applies only over the United States and
those additional areas which .have been incorporated into
the Union. It applies only to the United States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and the Territories of Alaska and Ha-
waii." In other areas, Congress has the power to provide
by law for the trial of civilians by means other than by
jury, in peace or war." The means used must not, of
course, result in a denial of due process of law.4" Granting
the necessity and propriety," there is no constitutional ob-
jection to the use in these other areas of the instrument of
court martial for the trial of civilians.
37 AGN 42(c).
38 Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S. 453, 464, 11 S. Ct. 897, 35 L. Ed. 581 (1891);
Callan v. United States, 127 U. S. 540, 549, 8 S. Ct. 1301, 32 L. Ed. 223 (1888);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1879). It does not apply
in Puerto Rico, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627
(1922), or the Virgin Islands. Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A.
3rd 1926), cert. denied sub nom., Francis v. Williams, 273 U. S. 693, 47 S. Ct. 91,
71 L. Ed. 843 (1926). In the Hawaiian Islands, it did not apply from 1898, the
date of acquisition, until 1900, the date Congress enacted a law making it appli-
cable. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 211, 23 S. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016 (1903).
See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 469 (1946),
noted 14 Gzo. WAsH. L. Rv. 522-25 (1946); 25 ORE. L. Rv. 135-38 (1946); dis-
cussed in CORWin, TorAL WAR AN THE C.NsiOTruoN 100-105 (1947).
89 See Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808, 49 L. Ed. 128
(1904). Congress has provided that whenever any foreign country or territory
is occupied by or under control of the United States, any person who there com-
mits certain crimes malum in se and later is found in the United States may be
returned thereto for a fair and impartial trial. Act of June 6, 1900, 31 STAT. 656
(1900), 18 U. S. C. 652 (1946), held constitutional in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S.
109, 21 S. Ct. 302, 45 L. Ed. 448 (1901). The trial might be by a court of the
military government, or, under AW 2(d) or AW 12, by Army court martial.
40 Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (W. D. Wash. 1943).
41 Under the language of U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Within the United States, the District of Columbia,
Alaska, and Hawaii, the right to jury trial does not apply
to:
(1) Martial law or military government situations;42
(2) Cases arising in the land or naval forces;
(3) Persons who violate the law of war;44 or
(4) Petty offenses,45 or crimes which were not of
a class traditionally triable by jury at com-
mon law.4
The effect of this right to jury trial is to limit the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial powers. The guaranty is for
the individual and against the federal government."' Any
federal enactment, executive regulation, or judicial action
which abridges the guaranty of a jury trial to a person or
class of persons to whom such guaranty is applicable is un-
constitutional.4
E. Cases Arising in the Naval Forces.
The guaranty of a jury trial is coupled with an exception
of "cases arising in the land or naval forces." " Irrespec-
42 See concurring opinion of Chief Justice Chase in Ex porte Milligan, 4 WalL
2, 141-142, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U. S. 1866); HYDE, INTENATiONAL LAW § 688 (2nd
ed. 1945); WErnER, A PRAcTiCAL MAxuAL or MATIL LAW 6-7 (1940).
48 The exception in the Fifth Amendment applies also to the Sixth. Amend-
ment. Ex parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 6349 (C. C. Ky. 1878); Ex
Parte Milligan, supra note 42, at 123, 138.
44 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942); In re Yam-
ashita, 327 U. S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946); Cowles, Universality oj
Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CALw. L. Rnv. 117 (1945).
45 Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 24 S. Ct. 826, 49 L. Ed. 99 (1904);
District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, S1 S. Ct. 52, 7S L. Ed. 177 (1930);
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 57 S. Ct. 660, 81 L. Ed. 843 (1937).
'See Rule 23, FmmmaL Ruixs or CpAmm PRocmnua; See Notes, 39 HARv. L. REv.
917 (1926); 13 So. CAxw. L. REv. 31, 33 (1939); 17 Id. at 41.
46 Ex Parte Quin, 317 U. S. 1, 4045, 63 S. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).
47 See Baron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (U. S. 1833); Fox v.
Ohio, 5 How. 410, 12 L. Ed. 213 (U. S. 1847); Davis v. Texas, 139 U. S. 651,
653, 11 S. Ct. 675, 35 L. Ed. 300 (1891); Eilenbecker v. Dist. Ct., 134 U. S. 31,
35, 10 S. Ct. 424, 33 L. Ed. 801 (1890).
48 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed.
140 (1896); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 518, 25 S. Ct. 514, 49 L.
Ed. 862 (1905) ; United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433, 42 S. Ct. 368, 66 L. Ed.
700 (1922).
49 By judicial construction. See note 43 supra.
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tive of this exception, however, the guaranty does not apply
beyond the continental United States and its organized Ter-
ritories,5" so that it is not violated by a statute subjecting
civilians to courts martial beyond those areas. Neither the
guaranty nor the exception, however, creates jurisdiction.5
The exception leaves a broad field for occupation by court-
martial jurisdiction, but the field is not occupied automati-
cally. Its occupation must be expressly authorized by stat-
ute or by treaty.
The two questions posed by the exception are when and
with respect to whom a case arises in the naval forces. In
In re Boga~rt,52 the word "cases" was interpreted as meaning
"events," and the phrase "cases arising in the land or naval
forces" was held entirely synonymous with the phrase
"offenses committed while the party is in the military serv-
ice." Bogart was a paymaster's clerk in the Navy, a quasi-
naval status which by regulations was then considered that
of a staff officer in the same class with paymasters. One
day he embezzled $10,000 of public funds and resigned.
About three years later "' he was arrested and tried by court
martial. He claimed that he was a civilian and that Congress
had no power to subject him to court martial. The federal
court held that he was a person in the Navy at the time of
embezzlement, and that even if he was a civilian at the time
of trial, the court martial had been given jurisdiction over
him by AGN 14 for trial for embezzlement. The court said
that there was no express limitation on the power of Con-
gress to authorize trial by court martial for naval offenses
50 Note 38 supra.
51, For discussion of the right of civilians to be tried by civil courts, see
John W. Curran, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 9 NoTRE DAUM LAwYn 26
(1933).
52 3 Fed. Cas. 796, No. 1596 (C. C. Calif. 1873).
58 The Secretary of the Navy had in 1870 established a 3-year. limitation,
ORDERs, REGULATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS loR TmE ADr nSmTRATxoN or LAW AND
JUsTIcE n" Tn U. S. NAVY § 138. (1870), but there was no statute of limitations
established for the Navy by Congress until 1895, when a 2-year period was pre-
scribed. See AGN 61 and 62, 28 STAT. 680 (1895), 34 U. S. C. § 1200, Art. 61
(1946).
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committed while in service of an offender whose connection
with the service had ceased, and that if such a limitation ex-
isted, it must be implied from a strained and unnatural con-
struction of "cases arising in the land or naval forces."
Winthrop, a recognized authority on military law, writing
in 1886, took the view that a civilian, entitled as he is to trial
by jury, cannot legally be made liable to military law and
jurisdiction in time of peace. 4 He believed that the term
"land forces" did not embrace discharged soldiers or any
other civilians,5" and the exception in the Fifth Amendment
recognized no third class which is part civil and part mili-
tary. 6 He noted the decision in the Bogart case, and indi-
cated his dissatisfaction. Trials of discharged persons were,
however, very infrequent."
In 1922, the case of Ex parte Joly " referred to the
Bogart case as interesting, and upheld the validity of AW 94
giving to Army courts martial jurisdiction over discharged:
persons subsequently charged with fraud against the govern-
ment committed while in the Army. Joly was an emergency
lieutenant colonel when he committed fraud against the gov-
ernment, punishable after discharge under AW 94, and con-
duct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman under AW 95,
which no express statute made punishable after discharge.
He was honorably discharged, was a civilian for about five
months, and then was commissioned as a major in the regu-
lar Army. Nine months later, he was convicted by court
martial for those offenses. The federal court denied his con-
tention that his discharge was a release from liability to trial
by court martial "for offenses committed prior to discharge,"
54 I WJNTTiop, M TARY LAW Awn PPRwENTS 127 (1886).
55 Id. at 129.
56 Ibid. This contention was refuted in U. S. ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 76 F.
Supp. 203 (Conn. 1947), afd, 167 F. (2d) 593 (C. C.A. 2nd 1948). See Pan
American Petroleum and Transport Co. v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 761, 771
(C. C. A. 9th 1926).
57 I WNTmop, MrrARY LAW AND PRECENTS 130 (1886).
58 WNTHRoP, MuARY -LAw AND PRECEBENTS 92 (2nd- ed. 1896, reprinted
1920).
59 290 Fed. 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).
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on the ground that AW 94 had stood for more than half a
century and that Congress had deemed it necessary that a
discharge not effect such release. Without citing any author-
ity, the court said that there must be power to dismiss an
officer whenever his offense is discovered, no matter when it
was committed. By dictum, the court declared that the
power of Congress extended to making punishable by court
martial a person in the military service for an offense com-
mitted before he entered that service.
In Terry v. United States,0 decided in 1933, the court
cited the Bogart and Joly cases as authority for the denial of
a jury trial. Terry was an Army enlisted man who had been
honorably discharged. A month later, while he was a civi-
lian, he was convicted by court martial of embezzlement un-
der AW 94, committed prior to discharge. The federal court
recognized the problem, and held that "cases arising in the
land or naval forces" referred to the time that the offense is
alleged to have been committed, rather than to the time that
steps are taken looking to a trial for that offense. It treated
as a conclusive answer an excerpt from dictum in Ex parte
Milligan " which said that Congress provided courts martial
"for offenses committed while the party is in the military or
naval service."
The fallacious concept which the court derived from the
excerpt may be readily seen by reading the entire paragraph
from which it was drawn: 2
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and
navy, required other and swifter modes of trial than are furn-
ished by the common law courts; and, in pursuance of the
power conferred by the Constitution, Congress had declared
the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be con-
ducted, for offenses committed while the party is in the mili-
tary or naval service. Every one connected with these
branches of the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction
which Congress has created for their government, and, while
60 2 F. Supp. 962 (W. D. Wash. 1933).
61 4 Wall. 2, 123, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U. S. 1866).
62 Ibid.
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thus serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil
courts. All other persons, citizens of states where the courts
are open, if charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestim-
able privilege of trial by jury. This privilege is a vital prin-
ciple, underlying the whole administration of criminal justice;
it is not held by sufferance, and cannot be frittered away on
any plea of state or political necessity. . . . (Emphasis sup-
plied).
The first sentence alone was relied upon in the Terry case for
the proposition that the power of Congress in "cases arising
in the land or naval forces" extended to and embraced cases
of "offenses committed while the party is in the military or
naval service," without regard to the fact that such party
may be a civilian when arrested, charged, or tried. The sec-
ond sentence was relied upon in U. S. ex rel. Fannery v.
Commanding General's for the proposition that the surren-
der of the right to a trial by civil courts was effective only
"while... serving" in some connection with the armed serv-
ices. It is submitted that the two sentences are complemen-
tary. The first indicates the relationship between offense and
time, by limiting the jurisdiction of courts martial over
offenses to those committed while the offender was in the
military or naval service. The second indicates the relation-
ship between person and time, by limiting the jurisdiction of
courts martial over persons to those connected with the land
and naval forces while they are so serving. The first relates
to the exercise of a constitutional power with regard to the
jurisdictional functions of offense and time. The second re-
lates to the scope of a constitutional power with regard to the
jurisdictional function of person and time. 4
68 69 F. Supp. 661, 66S (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
64 Some further light is shed upon the intent of the exception, "cases arising
in the land or naval forces," by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Chase
in the Milhigan case:
"Now we understand this exception to have the same import and effect as if
the powers of Congress in relation to the government of the Army and Navy
and the Militia had been recited in the amendment, and cases within those pow-
ers had been expressly excepted from its operation. The states, most jealous of
encroachments upon the liberties of the citizen, when proposing additional safe-
guards in the form of amendments, excluded specifically from their effect cases
arising in the government of the land and naval forces. Thus Massachusetts pro-
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The Flannery case " involved a man who was on leave of
absence from the U. S. Secret Service when inducted into the
Army. While he was a sergeant in the Army, he applied for
a New York retail liquor license, swearing that he would re-
sign from the Secret Service upon discharge from the Army,
a necessary oath because the law forbade members of the
Secret Service to engage in that business. He requested dis-
charge from the Army to return to the Secret Service, and
for that reason was discharged. A discharge of this type
gave no right to a separation allowance, but it was paid and
accepted. He returned to the Secret Service, and was given
three months' leave, during the course of which he received
a directive from the Secret Service telling him where to
report for duty. The following day he was arrested by the
Army, his discharge was cancelled, and he was held for court
martial charged with defrauding the government of the sepa-
ration allowance because his discharge was allegedly ob-
tained by fraud in that he had no intention of returning to
the Secret Service. The federal court held that Flannery's
military status had been terminated by the discharge,66 that
the determination of the conditions on which an individual
may or must change status from civilian to military was for
Congress, that the cancellation of a discharge for fraud pre-
sented a justiciable issue which, under Article III of the
Constitution, only a court could decide, and that any asser-
posed that 'no person shall be tried for any crime by which he would incur an in-
famous punishment or loss of life until he be first indicated by a grand jury, except
in such cases as may arise in the government and regulation of the land forces.' The
exception in similar amendments, proposed by New York, Maryland, and Virginia,
was in the same or equivalent terms. The amendments proposed by the states
were considered by the first Congress, and such as were approved in substance
were put in form, and proposed by that body to the states. Among those thus
proposed and subsequently ratified, was that which now stands as the fifth
amendment of the Constitution. We cannot doubt that this amendment was in-
tended to have the same force and effect as the amendment proposed by the
states. We cannot agree to a construction which will impose on the exception
in the fifth amendment a sense other than that obviously indicated by action of
the state conventions." Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 138, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U. S.
1866).
65 69 F. Supp. 661 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
60 As to the quality and effect of a discharge, see Part F, infra.
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tion of arbitrary power to cancel was made nugatory by
the requirement of due process. The court then considered
the constitutionality of the law " subjecting discharged per-
sons to trial by court martial, which depended, in Flannery's
case, upon the meaning of "cases arising in the land or naval
forces."
Judge Clancey found that the word "cases," which ap-
pears in the "cases and controversies" of Article III of the
Constitution, had been held to mean a claim brought before
a court by legal proceedings, and that whenever a claim
takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting
upon it, then it has become a case. These words were taken
out of the mouth of Judge Field in In Re Pacific Railway
Commission," who quoted Chief Justice Marshall as say-
ing: 69
This clause enables the judicial department to receive juris-
diction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States, when any question respecting them shall
assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of act-
ing on it. That power is capable of acting only when the sub-
ject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his- rights in the
form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the con-
stitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all
cases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States.
And Mr. Justice Story as saying:" °
It is clear that the judicial department is authorized to
exercise jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States, whenever any question re-
specting them shall assume such a form that the judicial
power is capable of acting upon it. When it has assumed
suck a form, it then becomes a case; and then, and not till
67 AW 94, similar to AGN 14.
68 32 Fed. 241, 256 (C. C. Calif. 1887).
69 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U. S.
1824).
70 2 STORY, COM3ENTARIES ON TRE CONSTITUTION Or THE UNITED STATES §
1646 (5th Ed. 1891). This doctrine is applied in non-criminal law. There is a clear
distinction between a "case arising under the patent -laws" and a "question arising
under the patent laws." The former arises when the plaintiff in his opening
pleading sets up a right under the patent laws as ground for recovery. Carleton
v. Bird, 94 Me. 182, 47 Atl. 154, 156 (1900).
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then, the judicial power attaches to it. A case, then, in the
sense of this clause of the constitution, arises when some sub-
ject touching the constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States is submitted to the courts by a party who asserts his
rights in the form prescribed by law.
The conclusion reached in the Flannery case 7' was that a
case has not arisen in the land or naval forces until a com-
plaint is framed or an arrest made. It denies that a case
arises at the time of the commission of an offense. It rejects
the Bogart case, and the language of the Joly and Terry
cases.
If the time when a "complaint is framed" be taken in a
broad sense, it includes the ordering of an investigation into
the conduct of a person not yet formally accused. That
criminal jurisdiction attaches at this point in time has been
recognized in many cases.72 Such an investigation justifies
the detention of a serviceman beyond the expiration of his
term of enlistment and the withholding of his discharge cer-
tificate pending the exercise of appropriate court-martial
action.78 The same sense is read into the guaranty in the
Fifth Amendment against being compelled "in any criminal
case" to be a witness against one's self, the Supreme Court
holding that an investigation by a grand jury is a "criminal
case" within the meaning of that Amendment.74 The "crimi-
nal prosecutions" in which there is a guaranty of trial by
jury in the Sixth Amendment is a term much narrower than
"criminal case," "I and relates to a prosecution which is
71 Noted and fully discussed with approval in 46 CoL. L. REv. 977-90 (1946).
72 In re Bird, 3 Fed. Cas. 425, No. 1428 (Ore. 1871); Barrett v. Hopkins, 7
Fed. 312 (C. C. Kans. 1881); U. S. ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden or Keeper of
Naval Prison, 265 Fed. 787 (E. D. N. Y. 1919); 31 Ops. ATrny. Gai. 521 (1919);
26 CMO 1917. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 24 L. Ed. 1118 (1879);
16 Ops. ATry. GzN. 349 (1879).
73 3 CMO 8 (1924).
74 Counselman v. Hitchock, 142 U. S. 547, 562, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110
(1892); United States v. Monia, Ill., 317 U. S. 424, 63 S. Ct. 409, 87 L. Ed. 376
(1943).
75 Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 74; Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.
(2d) 199, 203 (C. C. A. 10th 1942).
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technically criminal in its nature.76 The statute of limita-
tions applicable to the Navy states that no person shall be
tried by court martial for any offense which appears to have
been committed more than two years before the issuing of
the order for such trial.77 The theory involved seems to
imply that a case arises upon-the issuing of such order for
trial, and not upon the commission of the offense. In fact,
the delay in investigating an offense is at the peril of losing
criminal jurisdiction over that offense.
There are, then, conflicting views as to the time when a
case arises. If the view be accepted that a case emerges
full grown at the time of the commission of an offense, it
follows that Congress has power to subject veterans to courts
martial for any offense committed while in service, if the
exercise of such power is necessary and proper in order to
maintain a Navy. It also follows that on a trial for offenses
committed while in service, an accused has no right to a
jury trial. The exception of "cases arising in the land or
naval forces," however, does not mention courts martial. An
interesting problem created -by this view of a case arising
upon commission of an offense, a problem never considered
by a court, is whether, upon trial for fraud against the gov-
ernment in a federal court, a veteran could be denied a jury
trial on the ground that his was a case within the exception.
The fact is, however, that the federal courts have never
denied such rights.
The more reasonable view seems to be that which holds
that a case arises when some official action is taken which
is indicative of embarkation upon the procedural steps lead-
ing to ultimate criminal prosecution. If this view be ac-
cepted, 8 it follows that Congress has power to subject per-
76 United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475, 481, 16 S. Ct. 641, 40 L. Ed. 777
(1896).
77 Rzy. STAT. § 1624 Art 61 (1875), as inserted by the Act of Feb. 25, 1895,
c. 128, 28 STAT. 680 (1895), 34 U. S. C. § 1200 Art. 61 (1946).
78 It was termed "faficiful and technical" by so eminent a scholar as Ed-
mund M. Morgan, in an opinion based upon the Bogart case. Morgan, Court-
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sons in the land and naval forces to courts martial for of-
fenses committed prior to their entry into those forces. The
Ioly case 79 asserts the existence of such power, but it has
never been exercised." In time of war, when civilians may
be hurriedly called to the colors in large numbers, its exer-
cise could conceivably become necessary and proper in order
to raise armies and maintain a Navy, to speedily dispose of
complaints pending against draftees at the time of their
induction, and thus, in the words of Dean Roscoe Pound,8
to free our agencies of defense from unnecessarily hamper-
ing interference of local legal authorities. It also follows
that veterans whose connection with the service no longer
existed could be made punishable by federal courts for acts
or omissions committed while in service,"2 but could not be
subjected to courts martial.83
The determination of the point in time when a case arises
resolves only half of the meaning of the exception in the
Fifth Amendment. The jurisdiction which courts martial
exercise under statutory authority is a question secondary
and subordinate to the question of the power of Congress
to confer such jurisdiction. The power is granted by Article
I, section 8, of the Constitution. The exception in the Fifth
martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons under the Articles of War, 4
M mr. L. Ray. 79, 84 (1920). Underhill's rejection of this view is based solely
upon the Bogart case. Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in the United
States over Civilians, 12 CAar. L. REv. 75, 89 and 93 (1924).
79 290 Fed. 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).
80 The AGN begin, "The Navy of the United States shall be governed by
the following articles." Rav. STAT. § 1624 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200 (1946). The
AW begin, "The articles included in this chapter shall be known as the Articles
of War and shall at all times and in all places govern the Armies of the United
States." 41 STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1471 (1946). Acts or omissions com-
mitted by servicemen prior to their entry into the services are therefore not of-
fenses against existing military or naval law. This fact was apparently overlooked
in the Joly case dictum.
81 Foreword to Theodore Miller, Relation of Military to Civil and Adminis-
trative Tribunals in Time of War, 7 OHIo ST. L. J. 188, 190 (1941).
82 For the frauds against the government covered by AGN 14 and AW 94,
ex-servicemen are also within the jurisdiction of federal courts. United States v.
Barry, 260 Fed. 291 (S. D. N. Y. 1919). See United States v. McDonald, 265
Fed. 695 (E. D. N. Y. 1920).
88 United States ex rel. Flannery v. Comdg. Gen., 69 F. Supp. 661 (S. D. N. Y.
1946).
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Amendment relates to that power, and confers no jurisdic-
tion. It says, in effect, that Congress may deny the guaranty
of indictment and jury trial as to persons connected with the
land or naval forces against whom military or naval authori-
ties have embarked upon the procedural steps leading to
ultimate criminal prosecution. Congress may or may not
exhaust this power, but until its exercise courts martial have
no jurisdiction whatsoever.
Who are these persons covered by the exception? "In the
land or naval forces" does not necessarily restrict the appli-
cation of the exception to the uniformed personnel of the
armed services.8 4 This was recognized by the Supreme Court
as early as 1895 in Johnson v. Sayre,85 holding that a pay-
master's clerk in the Navy, though neither an enlisted man
nor an officer, was nevertheless a person in the Navy subject
to naval law. This position in the Navy had been estab-
lished by statute, but the bonds of the connection need not
be so tight. In Ex parte Quirin,8 the Court assumed without
deciding "that a trial prosecuted before a military commis-
sion created by military authority is not one 'arising in the
land or naval forces' when the accused is not a member of or
associated with those forces." The addition of the words "or
associated with" recognized the inclusion within the excep-
tion quoted of persons who are not members of the armed
services but who have some connection with the armed
forces.8 7 "Forces" is not synonymous with "military or naval
services," and never has been. 8 The early forces of England
included the mariners of the merchant vessels in which the
84 Ex porte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S. D. Tex. 1919).
85 158 U. S. 109, 15 S. Ct. 773, 39 L. Ed. 914 (1895). The same view had
been taken by a district court in the case of a paymaster's clerk employed by the
Army. In re Thomas, 23 Fed. Cas. 931, No. 13, 888 (N. D. Miss. 1869).
86 317 U. S. 1, 41, 63 S. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).
87 The same words are used in the last sentence of Hirshberg v. Cooke,.U.
S-.., 69 S. Ct. 530 (1949).
88 The distinction was brought pointedly to the attention of Congress dur-
ing the debate preceding the passage of the first law subjecting discharged and
dismissed persons to courts martial for fraud against the government. Cono. GLOBE,
37th Cong. 3rd Sess. 955 (1863).
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servicemen were transported.89 The ancient Court of Chiv-
alry heard the cases of non-military persons connected with
the armies' 0 Noncombatants included in the land forces and
accredited by military authority are recognized in interna-
tional law.9' And today, there are many civilians who are a
part of the body of our forces, but who are not members of
the armed services.
Congress cannot, of course, nullify the constitutional guar-
anty of jury trial by the expedient of making all civilians in
the United States a part of the land or naval forces.92 Civ-
89 Charles Richard Williams, On the History of Discipline in the Navy, 45
PROCEEDINGS OF THE U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 355, 367 (1919); Ordinance of Rich-
ard I (1190), recited in II GRoGS, HISTORY OF THE ENGaSH ARY 63, I HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 530 and 544.
90 MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 8 (British 1929); DAVIS, MILITARY LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 13 (3rd ed. 1913); Lt. Nathan Sargent, U. S. Navy, The
Evolution of Courts-Martial, 9 U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PRocEEDINGs 692, 694-S
(1883).
91 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE A ErO ATION OF THE CoDITiiN
OF THnE WOUNDED AND Sicx IN ARmIES IN THE FIELD, Chap. III; INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, Art. 61. Both
conventions were signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929.
9? In the interesting debate in Congress, preceding the passage of the first
law subjecting discharged and dismissed persons to courts martial for fraud against
the government, the power of Congress as restricted by the exception in the
Fifth Amendment was heatedly discussed. After amendment, the provision read:
"And be it further enacted, That any person heretofore called, or hereafter to
be called, into or employed in such forces or service who shall have committed
any violation of this act, and shall afterwards receive his discharge or be dis-
missed from the service shall, notwithstanding such discharge or dismissal, con-
tinue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-
martial in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not received
such discharge or been dismissed."
Contractors had been deleted from this section of the bill, and the question
as to whether, as amended, it applied to contractors was answered by Senator
Howard of Michigan, who sponsored the bill.
"Mr. Howard. This does not apply to contractors at all now.
Mr. Cowan. But it applies to employees of the Government in the service.
Mr. Howard. No, sir; it applies to persons in the military service, and
leaves to the courts the power to decide what persons are in the military service.
It is a judicial question, as I remarked before." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd
Sess. 958 (1863). But contractors in the land or naval forces were left in the
first section of the law, and a person who had a mere contract to furnish supplies
to the Army was held for court martial under it. He was released on habeas
corpus, the federal court holding that the contract did not put the accused in
the land forces, and that the earlier law (Act of July 17, 1862, § 16) providing
that such a contractor "shall be deemed and taken as part of the land or naval
forces" with which he contracted to furnish supplies was unconstitutional. Ex
parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, No. 6349 (C. C. Ky. 1878).
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ilians may be compelled to join the armed services, to what-
ever extent is necessary and proper to raise armies and main-
tain a navy.9" The same restrictions of necessity and pro-
priety must apply to the placing of civilians, as such, in the
land or naval forces. There must be a reasonable relation-
ship between the legislative act and the constitutional
power. 4 For a civilian to be "in land or naval forces,"
it would seem that there must exist some connection or as-
sociation with those forces which creates an obligation on the
part of such civilians directed toward the military mission of
the forces. One federal court describes the connection as
arising from "alignment with a military enterprise."95  The
commanders of such forces, under their duty to provide mili-
tary security, have the power to prevent civilians from ac-
companying or serving with their forces. The power to pre-
vent carries with it a concomitant power to permit. Civilians
serving with naval forces are under a direct obligation to
further, in line with their specialty, the mission of the forces.
Red Cross representatives, radar technicians, scientists, con-
tractors and subcontractors, and civil service employees,
while serving under competent orders or authority, are "in
the naval forces." Civilians accompanying naval forces are
under an implied obligation to do nothing to impede or ob-
struct the mission of the forces. News correspondents, civ-
ilian observers, independent traders, etc., while thus accom-
panying with the permission of naval authorities, are "in the
naval forces." The obligation, then, determines the status,
and the status, in turn, determines the power of Congress to
93 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349
(1917); United States v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423 (E.- D. Mich. 1917), and cases
there cited.
94 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, 58 S. Ct. 778,
82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938); cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315,
89 L. Ed. 430 (1945), rehearing denied, 323 U. S. 819, 65 S. Ct. 557, 89 L. Ed.
650 (1945); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103, 63 S. C't. 890, 87 L. Ed. 1290
(1943) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940) ;
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931).
95 Perlstein v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 123 (M. D. Pa. 1944).
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provide, within continental United States and the organized
Territories, a means of criminal prosecution other than by
jury.
Upon this theory, all the decided cases can be reconciled.
A civilian cook on a vessel under military control and engag-
ed in the transportation of troops or supplies to the war zone
is under a direct obligation to further the military mission,
and Congress had, by AW 2 (d), conferred upon Army courts
martial jurisdiction over such persons in time of war." A
merchant mariner on a ship which was not a part of the Navy
or under naval control had no direct or implied obligation
toward the naval mission.9" Congress had conferred no juris-
diction over such persons, and trial by military commission
for an offense against AGN was not justified under the law of
war. A civilian superintendent of an Army quartermaster
corps patrolling the U. S:-Mexican border was under an obli-
gation to further that mission, and Congress had, by AW 2,
conferred upon Army courts martial jurisdiction over such
persons while serving "in the field." " A civilian field audi-
tor employed by the government in the quartermaster's office
of a temporary Army cantonment is under a military obliga-
tion, and Congress had, by AW 2, conferred upon Army
courts martial jurisdiction over such persons while serving "in
the field." " A civilian automobile driver employed by a
civilian firm to transport civilian employees .to and from work
had no obligation toward the military mission, and the fact
that the firm had a routine construction contract with the
Army did not, of itself, create that obligation. °00 An ex-
serviceman, imprisoned under sentence of an Army court
martial, is still connected with the Army, is under an obliga-
96 Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (N. J. 1918); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F.
Supp. 80 (E. D. Va. 1943), noted in 44 CoL. L. Rxv. 575-8 (1944); 30 CORN.
L. Q. 108-11 (1944).
97 Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (W. D. Wash. 1943).
98 Ex parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S. D. Tex. 1919).
99 Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (C. C. A. 4th 1919), holding that meaning
of the phrase "in the field" was not to be determined by the localty, but rather
by the activity engaged in.
100 Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. 58 (Mass. 1919).
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tion to serve such sentence under Army control,and Congress
had, by AW 2 (e), conferred upon Army courts martial 1 '
jurisdiction over such persons."0 A civilian able to bear arms
is under a moral obligation to serve his country in time of
stress, and when he is lawfully called to the colors the obliga-
tion toward the military mission becomes a legal one. He is
then sufficiently connected with the land or naval forces to
come within the exception to the Fifth Amendment. Accord-
ingly, Congress has power to subject him to courts martial
from the time he is called, and, in World War I, did so. In
World War II, Congress did not exercise its power to the full
extent, subjecting the selectee to courts martial only after
actual induction into the service."'
Department opinions can be justified on the same theory.
A civilian employed by the government to unload military
supplies and munitions is under an obligation toward the
military mission.' A civilian employed by a private firm as
master of a vessel chartered by the government to carry mili-
tary supplies to the war zone is under a military obliga-
tion.10 Pilots of the Civil Air Patrol operating under mili-
tary control are under a military obligation.'01 A merchant
seaman on board a vessel carrying a Navy Armed Guard
crew is under obligation toward the naval mission. 01 But a
Canadian soldier at a U. S. Army school is under no obliga-
tion toward the U. S. military mission. 'o'
101 But not upon naval courts martial.
102 Ex parte Wildman, 29 Fed. Cas. 1232, No. 17653a (Kans. 1876); Carter v.
McClaughry, 183 U. S. 36S, 22 S. Ct. 181, 46 L. Ed. 236 (1902); Kahn v. Ander-
son, 255 U. S. 1, 41 S. Ct. 224, 65 L. Ed. 469 (1921).
108 Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 64 S. Ct. 737, 88 L. Ed. 917 (1944),
note in 32 GEo. L. J. 385, 393 (1944); 92 U. or PA. L. RE. 447-9 (1944); 28
M.Ui. L. REv. 334-5 (1944). Congress had, by AW 2(a) in 1916, 41 STAT. 787
(1916), 10 U. S. C. § 1473(a) (1946), given to Army courts martial jurisdiction
to try all persons lawfully called to duty in the Army, but the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 885 (1940), superseded, during the life of that
Act, this earlier enactment.
104 Ops. JAG Aa.rv 243 (1918).
105 Id. at 244.
106 1 JAG Aouy, Bu-L. 12 (1942).
10' 1 CMO 42, 43 (1944)..
108 2 JAG Auyr BuL.. 7 (1943).
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Other frequently cited cases are those in which the Army
initiated, at a time when the accused civilian was beyond the
continental United States and its organized Territories, the
regular processes looking toward a criminal prosecution."0 9
These cases do not depend upon the meaning of the excep-
tion "cases arising in the land or naval forces," because the
power of Congress is not restricted under such circumstances.
They depend upon the necessity and propriety 11o of the pro-
visions of law enacted by Congress to cover such situations.
The purpose of subjecting all persons accompanying or serv-
ing with the Army in these external areas was to permit their
disciplining "in places to which the civil jurisdiction of the
United States does not extend and where it is contrary to
international policy to subject such persons to the local juris-
diction, or where, for other reasons, the law of the local juris-
diction is not applicable, thus leaving these classes practically
without liability to punishment for their unlawful acts....""'
Congress has conferred upon naval courts martial jurisdiction
over certain civilians in these external areas in time of war or
national emergency, and its power to do so is in no way re-
stricted by the meaning and effect of the exception in the
Fifth Amendment. But the status of a person is the determi-
native factor in deciding whether he comes within the juris-
diction thus conferred. The words "accompanying or serv-
ing with" still import a connection or association with the
naval forces, and the nature of the required status still de-
mands the continuing existence of an obligation.
The connection or association, once made, is not disestab-
lished, even when the order or permission is revoked, until
109 Ez parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); In re Dilartolo, 50 F.
Supp. 929 (SD.N.Y. 1943) ; In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (SD. Ohio 1944) ; Perl-
stein v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Pa. 1944).
110 Under U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
111. In re DiBartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), quoting from congres-
sional hearings on AW 2 (1916). The same purpose was implied in granting sim-
ilar jurisdiction to naval courts martial. See Hearings before the Senate Naval
Affairs Commitee on S. 2899, 77th Cong., 2nd Session (1942). The scope of the
jurisdiction as to offenses is the same in the Army and Navy. Snedeker, Develop-
ments in the Law of Naval Justice, 23 NoTR DAE LAwYER 1, 5 and 17-18 (1947).
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the obligation toward the naval mission of such forces is
terminated."' 2 Normally, such obligation is not terminated
until the civilian concerned has passed beyond the area in
which he may further, or impede or obstruct, the naval mis-
sion. The obligation may, however, be terminated without
physical movement on the part of such a civilian, by the
termination of the naval mission of the forces he is accom-
panying or serving. It is definitely terminated under exist-
ing naval law, upon the officially declared end of the war or
national emergency, because Congress has not occupied the
peacetime field of its power.
An obligation connecting a person with the land or naval
forces may be found in certain classes of civilians who were
formerly in the armed services. Congress may, where neces-
sary, make a discharge from the armed services conditional
or voidable upon a condition subsequent, and the obligation
of those given such a discharge subsists after other elements
of connection with the services have been severed. Thus a
person discharged as a result of the sentence of a naval court
martial has not severed all connection with the naval service
so long as the Secretary of the Navy retains a power, granted
by statute, to set the sentence aside and thereby to avoid all
actions resulting from it."" Congress undoubtedly has power
to provide a proper means for avoiding a discharge obtained
by fraud, since a provision of this kind is reasonably neces-
sary to the maintenance of a Navy. If and when Congress
does so,114 a person dscharged before the expiration of his
term of service will be under a contingent liability and suffi-
cient obligation will subsist to justify assigning to him a con-
nection with the naval forces.
An obligation may cease to exist and be revived by the act
of the obligor. When a person's connection with the naval
112 See Perlstein v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 123 (M.D. Pa. 1944).
118 3 STAT. 621 (1909), 34 U.S.C. § 1200 Art. 54(b) (1946); U. S. ex. rel.
Harris v. Daniels, 279 Fed. 844 (C.CA. (2nd) 1922). See In re Bird, 3 Fed. Cas.
425, No. 1428 (Ore. 1871).
114 The proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice provides a constitutional
method. H.R. 2498, § 1, Art. 3 (b).
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forces has been completely severed prior to the attachment of
criminal jurisdiction, and his status has been changed, he is
again, within the United States and its organized Territories,
entitled to the benefits of the guaranty of a jury trial upon
his prosecution for crime. This guaranty is the impediment
to the existence of a power which would subject him to trial
by court martial. But the guaranty is in the nature of a
privilege, and, like the other guaranties contained in the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, may be waived by -the person
entitled to its benefits.115 A waiver removes the impediment,
and a statute which subjects to court-martial jurisdiction
only those civilians who waive the guaranty is free from con-
stitutional objection.11 Such a statute is that which provides
for court-martial jurisdiction over officers dismissed by order
of the President in time of war. "' To come within the scope
of that statute, the former officer must make a written appli-
cation for trial. This constitutes a voluntary waiver, in the
same manner that an appeal from a conviction for crime oper-
ates as a waiver of the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy.11 The waiver alone would not confer juris-
diction upon a court martial, for such jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by consent,1"9 but it may be said to revive an obli-
gation and to re-establish a sufficient connection with the
naval forces to bring the quondam officer within the scope of
the power of Congress. The provision for his trial by court
martial is a valid exercise of that power. 2 ' The application
for trial also has the effect of making the President's order
of dismissal voidable. It is avoided upon the happening of
either one of the conditions subsequent recited in the statute,
115 Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. (2d) 592 (C.C.A. 5th 1947), and cases therein
cited.
116 See 12 Ops. AT'y. Gm. 4 (1866); Street v. United States, 24 Ct. CL 230
(1889), aff'd, 133 U. S. 299, 10 S. Ct. 209, 33 L. Ed. 631 (1890).
117 REv. STAT. § 1624 Art. 37 (1875), 34 U.S.C. § 1200 Art. 37 (1946).
11'8 Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 18, 40 S. Ct. 50, 64 L. Ed. 103
(1919); Pratt v. United States, 102 F. (2d) 275, 279 (App. D. C. 1939).
119 See McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49, 22 S. Ct. 786, 46 L. Ed. 1049
(1902).
120 See 12 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 4 (1866); Street v. United States, 24 Ct. C1. 230
(1889).
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and when so avoided, the original obligation and connection
with the naval service are automatically restored with full
force.12' The theory of the revival of an obligation to and
connection with the naval forces at the time of the applica-
tion for trial is the only theory which fully supports these
subsequent effects of avoidance of the order of dismissal. 22
F. The Effect of Discharge
The most difficult problem of jurisdiction grows out of the
cases of those persons who have been discharged from the
armed services, and relates to the effect of a discharge. The
problem is one of status. The status of an individual must be
determined before we can arrive at any conclusion as to
whether Congress has the power to subject him to court mar-
tial and as to whether Congress has done so.
A person in one of the armed services is subject to mili-
tary or naval law solely by virtue of his status with respect to
that service.'28 The emphasis on status originally developed
during the congressional debate at the time that Congress
first attempted to give Army courts martial jurisdiction over
discharged persons, Senator Howard saying, "A man's liabili-
ty to punishment by court martial must necessarily depend
upon his status, that is, whether he is in the military forces
.. . or whether he is not. .... 124 The contract analogy
alone is of little value, especially since the adoption by this
country of compulsory military service. In World War I,
the draftee was subject to military law from the time he
was ordered to report for induction, 2 and he could be
punished even if the order itself was unlawful. 26 In World
War II, the selectee was subject to military law only after
122; A5 Ops. AT'TY. GEr. 569 (1876).
122 This theory is advanced in Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in
the United States over Civilians, 12 CAI.w. L. R v. 75, 90 and 93 (1924).
128 United States v. Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 11 S. Ct. 54, 34 L. Ed. 636 (1890);
United States v. Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157, 11 S. Ct. 57, 34 L. Ed. 634 (1890).
124 Coto. GaOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 952 (1863).
125 Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 76 (1917).
126 Ex parte Romano, 251 Fed. 762 (Mass. 1918).
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actual induction, 27 but that induction could be lawfully con-
summated under the threat of criminal prosecution in the
federal courts. 2 ' The status, then, can be altered by statute
rather than consent. Even in voluntary enlistments, status is
the criterion. An enlistment induced by fraudulent repre-
sentations of the enlistee serves to change the status from ci-
vilian to military.'29 If an ordinary contract is made by a mi-
nor, he has power to disaffirm it, but if the contract is one of
enlistment, he has no such power because his status has
changed.' 80 The Supreme Court drew an analogy from cases
involving marriage, a contract which changes status with res-
pect to society. It is also analogous to cases involving natu-
ralization, which changes status with respect to the govern-
ment and involves fundamental rights of the citizen. In our
discussion regarding persons who are admittedly civilians,
we have seen that the status of being connected or associated
with the land or naval forces is the governing factor in de-
termining the applicability within the United States of the
exception in the Fifth Amendment, and that the status of
accompanying or serving with naval forces is determinative
of the applicability of the 1943 law subjecting persons of
that status to AGN. It is the status of discharged persons
that is now in dispute.
An unconditional discharge from one of the armed services
effects a change of status from military to civilian.' It
does not necessarily terminate the jurisdiction over the per-
son discharged, because the question of jurisdiction is one
127 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 885 (1940); Billings
v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 64 S. Ct. 737, 88 L. Ed. 917 (1944).
128 See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 567
(1946); cf. Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 64 S. Ct. 346, 88 L. Ed. 305
(1944), rehearing denied, 321 U. S. 802, 64 S. Ct. 517, 88 L. Ed. 1089 (1944), re-
hearing denied, 322 U. S. 770, 64 S. Ct. 1147, 88 L. Ed. 1595 (1944), noted in 32
GEo. L. J. 385-7 (1944); 20 IowA L. R v. 649-52 (1944); 35 J. CPm. LAw 43-4
(1944).
129 In re Grimiley, 137 U. S. 147, 11 S. Ct. 54, 34 L. Ed. 636 (1890).
130 United States v. Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157, 11 S. Ct. 57, 34 L. Ed. 634
(1890).
181 See Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 GFo. L. J. 303,
313 (1947).
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which Congress may, within the limitations of the right to
jury trial and the guaranty of due process, determine. A
discharge may terminate the military or naval status and yet
leave the discharged person in a civilian status, such as that
of accompanying or serving with naval forces, which Con-
gress had validly declared subject to military or -naval law." 2
Or the discharged -person may re-enlist or be thereafter in-
ducted so that his status again changes by the action of the
parties in accordance with law or by operation of law from
that of civilian to that of military."'3 The jurisdiction of a
court martial over the person of the accused depends upon
the status of the accused at the time he is artested or action
leading to criminal prosecution is taken, whichever is earli-
er."34 A court martial has been given no power to determine
with legal finality the status upon which its jurisdiction de-
pends, and if its jurisdiction is challenged by habeas corpus
on this ground, a federal civil court will determine from the
circumstances the existence or non-existence of the essential
status.13 5 (It is true that the burden of establishing the ju-
risdictional facts rests upon the party asserting them.) The
independent examination of these circumstances by the civil
132 Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F. (2d)'745 (C.C.A. 10th 1944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 800, 65 S. Ct. 552, 89 L. Ed. 638 (1945); 16 Ops. AT'Y. GEN. 292 (1879);
Id. 349 (1879).
18 A discharge under any enlistment absolutely terminates any contractual re-
lation between the government and the sailor, and the new relations assumed by
each in connection with re-enlistment are entirely separate and distinct from the
relations theretofore existing, except as they are altered by statute or regulation
applicable to the new status arising from the re-enlistment. United States v. Smith,
67 F. (2d) 412, 414 (C. C. A. 9th 1933), af'd, 292 U. S. 337, 54 S. Ct. 721, 78
L. Ed. 1295 (1934).
134 In re Bird, 3 Fed. Cas. 425, No. 1428 (Ore. 1871); United States ex rel.
Flannery v. Comdg. Gen., 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.DN.Y. 1946) See Ex Parte Wilson,
33 F. (2d) 214 (E. D. Va. 1929). The question as to whether a person admittedly
subject to court-martial jurisdiction may be tried under existing naval law for an
offense committed prior to the issuance of an admittedly valid unconditional honor-
able discharge from an earlier period of service has been decided in the negative.
A recent decision of the U. S. Supreme Court held that court-martial jurisdiction
over non-fraudulent naval offenses does not survive such a discharge. United
States 'e rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, ....U. S....., 69 S. Ct. 530 (1949). cf. 31 Ops.
Ar'r. Gm'. 521 (1919); Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 Gao.
L. 3. 303, 313 (1947).
185 Ver Mehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. (2d) 876 (C.CA. 8th 1929); Billings v.
Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542, 64 S. Ct. 737, 88 L Ed. 917 (1944). -
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court, without reliance upon the finding of facts by the court
martial, is essential to the proper determination of the juris-
dictional dispute.1es There is no basis for a view that the de-
termination of a trial court as to its own jurisdiction is res
judicata, least of all of a trial court of special and limited
jurisdiction like that of a court martial.'3 7
Methods of separation from the armed services are pre-
scribed under authority of law. 88 Once this separation is
validly accomplished, by discharge or otherwise, any at-
tempted revocation or cancellation by' the unilateral action
of the executive branch of the government will be ineffective
to restore the separated person to his former status.'39 A
136 In 1944, in Billings v. Truesdell, supra note 135, the Supreme Court inde-
pendently examined the Army's claim of jurisdiction, and found it invalid. This
was in accord with the rule laid down by the Court in 1921 that evidence outside
the record of proceedings of a court martial is admissible to show the existence of
jurisdictional facts. Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 20, 41 S. Ct. 227, 65 L. Ed.
475 (1921). But in 1945, a federal district court refused to make an independent
examination of the facts found by a court martial to exist. Ex parte Potens, 63
F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Wis. 1945).
137 See Boskey qnd Braucher, Jurisdiction and Colateral Attack, 40 CoL. L.
Ray. 1006 (1940).
18 Navy: Rav. STAT. § 1422 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 201 (1946); 37 STAT. 331
(1912), 34 U. S. C. § 195 (1946). See Exec. Order of President, Aug. 13, 1902, as
amended.
Army: AW 108, 41 STAT. 809 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1580 (1946).
Generally: See WINmiRoP, Mn.rrARy LAW AxD PR. -mETs 548-52 (2nd
ed. 1896); DAvis, MI=TARY LAW op TnE- UNxran STATES 352-58 (3rd ed. 1913); 46
CoL. L. Ray. 977, 981-3 (1946). It was held as early as 1830 that a discharge
prior to expiration of the term of enlistment could not legally be issued without
authority of law. 2 Ops. AiT'. GE. 353 (1830).
'39 Revocation of dismissal ineffective: United States v. Corson, 114 U. S.
619, 5 S. Ct. 1158, 29 L. Ed. 254 (1885); Miller v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 338
(1884). See Wallace v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 396, 403 (1920), aff'd, 257 U. S.
541 (1922), rehearing denied, 258 U. S. 296, 42 S. Ct. 318, 66 L. Ed. 626 (1922).
Revocation of acceptance of resignation ineffective: Mimmack v. United States,
97 U. S. 426, 24 L. Ed. 1067 (1878).
Revocation of mustering-out order ineffective: Palen v. United States, 19 Ct.
Cl. 389 (1884).
Revocation of certificate of service ineffective: Durant v. Hironimus, 73 F. Supp.
79 (S.D.W. Va. 1947), reversed on ground that jurisdiction of a court martial had
attached prior to receipt of the certificate of service and was therefore not affected
thereby, Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 4th 1948), cert. denied,
....U. S., 69 S. Ct. 40 (1948).
Revocation of discharge issued by mistake of fact ineffective: 4 Ops. Comsp.
Ga. 773 (1925); Ops. JAG ARm'y, DIoEST 445 (1912).
Revocation of discharge induced by fraud ineffective: United States ex reL
Flannery v. Comdg. Gen., 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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discharge is viewed as a formal, final judgment passed by the
government on the record made by the person while in serv-
ice, 140 so that not even the character or quality of the dis-
charge may thereafter be changed,'41 except in a manner pro-
vided for by law. 42 Congress has not authorized a change of
status from civilian to military except by the bilateral action
of the parties (enlistment or appointment) or by operation of
law (induction). Without compliance with the authorized
formalities, a military status cannot be assumed after the
change from military to civilian status has occurred.143
Congress has power to provide, where necessary and prop-
er, that certain discharges shall not irrevocably change the
status from military to civilian.144 Congress has exercised
this power by providing that the sentences of courts martial
may be set aside by the Secretary of the Navy. The only
types of discharge which may be imposed by sentence of a
140 United States v. Kelly, 15 Wall. 34, 36, 21 L. Ed. 106 (1873), as explained
in United States v. Landers, 92 U. S. 77, 23 L. Ed. 603 (1876), and cited with
approval in Hirshberg v. Cooke, ....U. S....., 69 S. Ct. 530 (1949) ; Ex parte Drainer,
65 F. Supp. 410 (N. D. Calif. 1947), aff'd, on appeal 158 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A.
9th 1947), 59 HARV. L. REv. 1156 (1947).
141 4 Ops. ATr'v. GEN. 274 (1843).
142 Congress in 1944 authorized the Secretary of the Navy to establish boards
to review the type and nature of the discharges and dismissals of naval personnel
and conferred upon such boards the power "to change, correct, or modify any dis-
charge or dismissal" except in the case of a discharge or dismissal by reason of the
sentence of a general court martial, and "to issue a new discharge in accord with
the facts presented to the board." Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, § 301,
58 STAT. 286 (1944), 38 U. S. C. § 693h (1946). It will be noted that Congress
did not authorize these boards to cancel a discharge and thereby restore a former
member of the armed services to his previous military status. 7 CMO 241 (1947).
Congress in 1946 authorized the establishment of a civilian Board for the Correc-
tion of Naval Records to change any naval record, to correct an error or remove
an injustice. 60 STAT. 932, 38 U.S.C. § 693h (1946). This authority is not restricted
by the fact that an error or injustice may have resulted from the sentence of a
general court martial. 40 OPs. ATr'v. GzN. No. 119 (Feb. 24, 1947); CMO 221
(1947).
143 4 OPs. Cozws. GEN. 777 (1925): "too plain for argument."
144 It has been suggested, as one solution to the problem of bringing to jus-
tice discharged persons whose crimes committed while in service were not discovered
prior to their final separation from the service, that Congress make all separations
conditional for a period of one year from date of separation, and expressly give
to courts martial jurisdiction over individuals formerly subject to military or naval
law whose separations were conditional. Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Pun-
ishment, 35 GEO. L. 3. 303, 326 (1947). For an alternative solution, see note
170 infra.
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court martial are bad conduct and dishonorable. The exe-
cution of such discharges prior to any action upon the court-
martial sentences by the Secretary makes the change of status
legally subject to a condition subsequent, and a subsequent
setting aside of the discharge has the effect of nullifying it
ab initio."I In such a case the temporary and conditional de
facto status of civilian is viewed as never having existed, and
the military status as never having been interrupted. Wheth-
er this view is correct, or whether the status is again changed
to military, there is now the authority of law for effecting
the result. The provision in AGN 14 (and AW 94) subject-
ing discharged or dismissed persons to trial by court martial
for fraud against the government committed while in service
is not now, however, dictated by practical necessity. 4 ' Such
offenses are now triable in the federal courts as offenses
against the Federal Criminal Code.1 7  The Navy in 1947
recommended the repeal of this provision, 148 and the pro-
posed Uniform Code of Military Justice omits it."4 9 The dis-
charge is not made conditional by the statute conferring
jurisdiction upon the courts martial, "o and is not revoked
by a court-martial conviction of the discharged person. 151
145 U. S. ex. rel. Harris v. Daniels, 279 Fed. 844 (C. C.A. 2nd 1922), noting
that whereas the Secretary of the Navy had been asserting and exercising such
authority for years, in 1908 he asked for statutory authority and was granted
it in the following year. For the same effect of a discharge imposed by an Army
court martial, see In re Bird, 3 Fed. Cas. 425, No. 1428 (Ore. 1871).
146 When the original forerunner of AGN 14 (11) and AW 94, the Act of
March 2, 1863, was passed, there existed no comparable federal law of general appli-
cation, and the need of a fraud statute directed toward the armed services was
then a practical necessity. See CoNG. GLoBa, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 952-8 (1863).
147 40 STAT. 1015 (1918), as amended, U. S. CODE CONG. SRV., Unbound
Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 286, 287, 641, 1001, 1022-24, 1361 (1948).
148 In transmitting to the 80th Congress proposed amendments to AGN, the
Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a
letter dated May 22, 1947, in which he said, "By reason of their discharge or dis-
missal such persons become civilians and should be tried by Federal civil courts
under 18 United States Code, chapter 5. Paragraph 11 of present article 14 is pro-
posed to be repealed." H. R. Doc. No. 144, 80th Cong. 1st. Sess. (1947). See
Snedeker, Developments in the Law of Naval Justice, 23 NoTma DAsm LAwym 1,
14 (1947).
149 H.R. 2498, § 1, Art. 132.
150 It tacitly admits the validity of the discharge, and provides for the trial
of the discharged person "in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had
not received such discharge." (Emphasis supplied.)
i51 See 7 CMO 4, 5 (1937), iexplaining the failure of the court martial to in-
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Under existing law, a deserter who fraudulently re-enlists
in the service from which he deserted and receives an un-
conditional discharge from that enlistment cannot be tried
for his desertion from the prior enlistment because his status
has changed to that of a civilian over whom no court-martial
jurisdiction has been conferred.152 But an obligation toward
the military mission subsists from the prior enlistment, and
this connection with the armed forces is sufficient to justify
subjecting him by law to court-martial jurisdiction. This
the Navy in 1947 specifically requested Congress to do,'53
and the proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice em-
bodies such a provision.154
A discharge which is not made conditional either by its
terms or by operation of law may still be voidable because
its issuance was induced by fraudulent representations. A
discharge, in one aspect at least, is in the nature of a release
from the obligations of a contract, in this case, the contract
of enlistment. If the obligations have been fully discharged,
the certificate of discharge is mere evidence of that fact.15
If they have not been 'fully discharged, the performance of
the unfulfilled obligations is, by the discharge certificate,
waived by the party to whom the performance is due. 5 ' In
ordinary contracts, fraud, 5 in the inducement makes the
elude dismissal in its sentence of imprisonment on the ground that the ex-officer
had already been honorably discharged from the naval service.
152 Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (N. D. Calif. 1946), af'd, 158 F. (2d)
981 (C. C. A. 9th 1947); 7 CMO 257 (1946); 2 CMO 36 (1947). See 31 Ops.
An'y. GEN. 521 (1919).
i1s H.R. 3687 and S. 1338 (star print), 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947).
154 H.R. 2498, § 1, Art. 3 (c).
155 Once standards governing the issuance of the various types of discharge
have been established, a mandate may issue from a federal court compelling the
issuance of the appropriate certificate. Lamb v. Patterson, 154 F. (2d) 319 (App.
D. C. 1946).
156 The Army, under the 1940 draft law, granted outright discharges to thous-
ands of enlisted men in order that they might enter essential industry. Such dis-
charges were held absolute and unconditional. Parliman v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 163 F.(2d) 726 (C.CA. 3rd 1947).
157 The word "fraud" in connection with the inducement to obtain a contract
or a discharge is here and hereafter used to mean misrepresentations, and not
used in the technical sense of fraud as a criminal offense, defined in Pence v. United
States, 316 U. S. 332, 338, 62 S. Ct. 185, 86 L. Ed. 484 (1942).
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contract voidable. 5 ' If the fraud induced the release from
the contract, the release is voidable.'59 Voidable contracts
are of two kinds. In one kind, the party having the power
of avoidance need take no affirmative action, merely relying
upon the defense of fraud if action is brought against him. In
the other kind, he must take the affirmative action in order
to prevent the contract from taking legal effect. The nec-
essary action in some cases is merely a manifestation of in-
tent to avoid; in others, it is the offer of return of the consid-
eration received.' The power of the United States to avoid
for fraud is not conditional upon an offer of return of con-
sideration. 6' Reasonable notice is the action required where
the government is the party with the power of avoidance.
This power is lost if, after acquiring knowledge of the fraud
the government unreasonably delays manifestation of its in-
tent to avoid, and the delay is at its peril. The power is
also lost if, after acquiring knowledge, the government mani-
fests an intent to affirm.162
If the instrument in question is one which has the effect
of changing status, however, these contract rules are insuffi-
cient. In the case of marriage, the change is made through
the bilateral agreement of the parties in a procedure pres-
cribed by or recognized by law, but the marriage status can-
not be annulled or dissolved without the intervention of a
third party duly empowered by law, namely, the judge of
a court. In the case of naturalization, citizenship, once ac-
quired, cannot be divested by the unilateral action of the ex-
ecutive branch of the government, but may be divested on
the plea of that branch in a proceeding prescribed by law
and involving the intervention of a third party, namely, the
judge of a court. 63 The reasons for such intervention are
158 RESTATMENT, CONTRACTS § 476 (1932).
159 Id. Illustration 4.
160 Id. § 431e.
161 Id. §§ 480, 487, 488; Pan American Petroleum and Transport Co. v.
United States, 9 F. (2d) 761, 771 (C.C.A. 9th 1926).
162 RESTATEMET, CONTRACTS §§ 483,484 (1932).
163 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 64 S. Ct. 1240, 88 L. Ed.
1525 (1944); Schneidernan v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L.
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that "new relations and new interests" flow from the status
acquired, and that these "should not be undone unless the
proof is compelling that that which was granted was ob-
tained" by fraud."8 4 Obviously the compelling quality of the
proof is not a matter to be determined arbitrarily by the
party who alleges the fraud. Important rights dependent
upon status are involved, and the dispute presents a
justiciable issue for the determination of the courts." 5
In cases involving patents and land grants issued by the
government, the proper procedure for cancellation has been
suit by the government in the federal courts." 8 The Su-
preme Court has refused to recognize the administrative
revocation of a land grant on the ground of fraudulent pro-
Ed. 1796 (1943), rehearing denied, 320 U. S. 807, 64 S. Ct. 24, 88 L. Ed. 488
(1943); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 32 S. Ct. 613, 56 L. Ed.
1066 (1912); United States v. Jackson, 55 F. Supp. 517 (E. D. Mich. 1944).
184 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baungartner v. United States, supra note 163,
at 675.
165 U. S. ex tel. Flannery v. Comdg. Gen., 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Judge Clancy in that case did not indicate the remedy or procedure by which the
aggrieved party might present the justiciable issue. It seems, however, that the
language of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, U. S. CoDFe CoNG. SERv., Un-
bound title 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1948), would enable the government to apply for
and obtain from a federal court a declaration of avoidance of a voidable discharge.
It reads: "In cases of actual controversy ... any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is
or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." The two principal criteria
for the use of this procedure are that a declaratory judgment (1) will serve a use-
ful purpose in clarifying and settling legal relations in issue, and (2) will termi-
nate and afford relief from uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy. Delno v.
Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 9th 1942). A petition for a judicial
construction of a contract made in reliance upon certain representations to deter-
mine whether the contract is terminated by the existence of facts contrary to those
representations was held a proper remedy under the Act. Auto Mutual Indemnity
Co. v. Dupont, 21 F. Supp. 606 (Del. 1937), petition being denied on ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable party defendant. Under this
section, a complainant need only show that his position is jeopardized by a stat-
ute, regulation, or order, and thereupon the court will afford relief for any uncer-
tainties with respect to his rights. Gordon v. Bowles, 153 F. (2d) 614 (1946),
cert. denied, 328 U. S. 858, 66 S. Ct. 1350, 90 L. Ed. 1629 (1946). Constitutional
questions are subjects for declaratory judgments. Mills v. Bd. of Education of
Anne Arundel County, 30 F. Supp. 245 (Md. 1939).
166 United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 9 S. Ct. 90,
32 L. Ed. 450 (1888); Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, 7 S. Ct. 1015, 30
L. Ed. 949 (1887); United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378, 26 L. Ed. 167 (1880).
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curement as having any legal effect, holding that the courts
of justice present the only remedy."" If this be true when
dealing with property rights, a fortiori, it must be true when
dealing with fundamental liberties of the individual.'
There is a great public interest in the finality of an uncondi-
tional discharge from the armed services. Millions of our ci-
tizens have in the past few years been so discharged, and all
connection between them and the land and naval forces
severed. If Congress can validly subject such discharged
persons to court-martial jurisdiction by the enactment of a
statute which does not purport to call them again into mili-
tary service, which requires of them the performance of no
military duties, then its power is not restricted to those who
had committed fraud against the government, but extends
to all those who have committed any offense while in ser-
vice."' A discharge would have little value, and, at least
during the running of the statute of limitations, could be
scrapped at the will of the executive. Millions of citizens in
the United States who had become established in civilian
business and society would be liable to the loss of their per-
sonal freedom by the stroke of a military pen. Such a situa-
tion would be intolerable, and would make a.mockery of the
Bill of Rights.' 1" If Congress ever passed a statute of such
scope, the Supreme Court in examining its validity would
look for the reasonable relationship between the legislative
act and constitutional authority. On comparison with pre-
16 Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 533, 24 L. Ed. 848 (1878). See United
States v. Stone, 106 U. S. 525, 1 S. Ct. 287, 27 L. Ed. 163 (1882).
168 See Note, 46 CoL. L. Rav. 977, 984-5 (1946).
169 Id. at 990. See note 144 supra.
170 As an alternative solution to the problem of bringing to justice discharged
persons whose crimes committed while in service were not discovered prior to their
final separation from the service, it has been suggested that Congress give to the
federal courts jurisdiction over all persons formerly subject to military or naval
law for acts or omissions, committed while in service, which were violations of
that law and of a nature not exclusively military, irrespective of the place where
such acts or omissions were committed. Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Pun.
ishment, 35 Gao. L. J. 303, 327 (1947). For another suggested solution, see note
144 supra.
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cedents involving fundamental personal liberties," it would
surely find a lack of such relationship. A reasonable rela-
tionship between a statute authorizing some judicial body,
even a court martial, to pass judgment upon the status of
a dischargee who allegedly obtained his discharge by fraud,
and the constitutional power to maintain a Navy and to gov-
ern the naval forces might well be found. But Congress has
not yet enacted such a statute .1' And it has not passed any
law giving to the armed services authority arbitrarily to re-
voke a discharge for fraud, so that its power to do so is not
immediately in issue. Yet without such an enactment, both
the Navy 173 and the Army 174 assert such authority.
The contention that such executive authority exists relies
upon two opinions of the Attorney General. 5 In 1879, in
the case of Prior H. Colman,'" the revocation of an honor-
able discharge from the Army was upheld on the ground
that the conditions under which it was legally possible to
171 The right to freedom of speech outweighs interference with the admin-
istration of justice. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed.
192 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295
(1946). The right to counsel outweighs the efficient prosecution of crime. Powel
v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932); DeMeerleer v.
Michigan, 329 U. S. 663, 67 S. Ct. 596, 91 L. Ed. 471 (1947). The right to re-
ligious freedom outweighs the power to demand expressions of loyalty. West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed.
1628 (1943). The right to trial by jury outweighs the convenience of trial by mil-
itary tribunals. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, 317, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90
L. Ed. 688 (1946).
172 Hearings were begun in Congress in March 1949 on the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, a proposed statute which contains a provision for judicially resolv-
ing such cases by conferring upon courts martial that power and restricting the
issue to be tried to that of the accused's status. H.R. 2498, § 1, Art. 3(b).
178 JAG NAvY, file MM/L16-4 (340613) of Jan. 14, 1939. See 151 CMO 10,
11 (1920). The Navy asserts the power to revoke a discharge in order that the
alleged offender may be tried by court martial.
174 JAG ARmY, IV BurL.. 237 (1945). War Department letter, file AG 220.8
(31 Aug. 1944) B-S-A-SPGAM-M of Sept. 10, 1944, directed commanding generals
of service commands to make administrative determinations when questions arise
regarding discharges alleged to have been procured by fraud. Th.e Army asserts
and exercises a power not only to revoke a discharge for fraud (Me JAGA-
1947/4691) but also, upon such revocation, to discharge the alleged offender un-
der conditions other than honorable and without trial by court martial. Files
JAGA-1946/6570 and SPJGA-1945/4523.
175 See NAvAL DiEsT 184 (1916).
176 16 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 349 (1879).
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issue the honorable discharge did not exist. Coleman was
under a death sentence imposed by a general court martial,
and had escaped. Five years later, upon his application mis-
stating the facts, the honorable discharge was issued. No ci-
tations of authority were given by the Attorney General,
and the case is no parallel to that of a discharged person
whose obligation to, and connection or association with, the
Army do not exist at the time criminal jurisdiction is first
asserted over him. In Coleman's case, the obligation and the
jurisdiction never ceased to exist during the period he was
a fugitive from justice. In 1910, an enlisted man of the Navy
named James Hall was serving a sentence imposed by a gen-
eral court martial. He made a fraudulent confession of mur-
der. This offense, because it was allegedly commited in the
United States, was beyond the jurisdiction of a naval court
martial. Hall was delivered to the civil authorities and,
prior to adequate investigation, was discharged with the dis-
honorable discharge included in his court-martial sentence.
Subsequently, this discharge was revoked for fraud. The
Attorney General upheld his action 7 on the ground that it
would be contrary to the most elementary principles of the
law (without citing any law) to permit Hall to defeat the
ends of justice and obtain his liberty by deceit. For authori-
ty, he cited only the prior opinion in the Coleman case, and
a Pennsylvania state case which held that a pardon obtained
by fraud was void. Hall's discharge was voidable, not void,
and the problem of status and of legitimate methods of
changing status was not discussed.
.It might be contended that upon analogy to the adminis-
trative avoidance of an enlistment voidable for fraud, the
authority to avoid a discharge for fraud exists. Such a con-
clusion would be a non sequitur. Congress has given to the
armed services broad authority to change a military status
to a civilian status through .the medium of discharge . 7 This
177 28 Ops. ATr'y. GEN. 170 (1910).
178 Note 138 mpra.
JURISDICTION OF NAVAL COURTS MARTIAL
authority applies as well to the enlisted man whose contract
is not voidable as to the one whose contract is voidable for
fraud. No additional authority is needed. Congress, how-
ever, has given to the armed services a very limited authori-
ty to change a civilian status to that of a military one. The
methods of induction, voluntary enlistment, and voluntary
appointment are the only methods authorized." 9 The recall
to duty for disciplinary purposes has been authorized as to
certain classes of persons who have continuing obligations
as members of the reserve components of the naval forces,'
but such recall has not been authorized .as to any persons
whose connection with the armed services has been finally
and completely severed by a discharge subsequently alleged
to have been fraudulently obtained. The obtaining of a dis-
charge by fraud admittedly presents a close relationship to
the power to maintain a Navy and to the power to make
rules for its government. Other offenses committed while
in service and discovered only after discharge present a more
remote relationship. Congress might validly confer upon
courts martial the power to determine in the first instance
the issue of the status of a dischargee in a trial limited to the
determination of the allegations of fraud in the inducement.
The point here made is that Congress has not yet done so.'8 '
The argument of the Flannery case that no executive
authority could be given, because the justiciable issue pre-
179 Involuntary extension of enlistment, such as was effected by the Act of
Dec. 13, 1941, ch. 570 § 1, 55 STAT. 799 (1941), 34 U. S. C. § 186 (1946), and
Navy Alnav dispatch No. 155 of 1941, continued by operation of law an existing
status. Ex Parte Taylor, 73 F. Supp. 161 (D. C. Calif. 1947).
180 52 STAT. 1180 (1938), 34 U. S. C. §§ 855, 855a (1946). The subjection of
Fleet Reservists to court-martial jurisdiction at all times was recently upheld as a
means reasonably adapted to maintaining a Navy without sole dependence upon
large professional naval forces. The limits of the power of Congress, as restricted
by the exception in the Fifth Amendment, were held not so narrowly drawn as to
include only full-time active service forces, but extended to persons of military or
naval status who, being trained, were sought to be kept in a state of readiness for
immediate service. U. S. ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 76 F. Supp. 203 (Conn. 1947),
aff'd, 167 F. (2d) 593 (1948). The opinion specifically refutes Winthrop's argu-
ment that the Constitution contemplates that status must be either wholly military
or wholly civilian. See note 56 supra.
181 See note 172 supra.
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sented is one which only a court may determine, is a strong
one against administrative action. The application of military
law depends upon the status of the accused, and he must
be given a judicial hearing of his contention that his status
is not one to which military law applies. This hearing might
conceivably be held before a court martial, provided (1)
that express jurisdiction to determine this issue is given by
Congress, (2) that no other charges are preferred and no
other military proceedings are conducted until this issue is
determined,' 2 and (3) that the determination of this issue
by a court martial does not preclude an independent investi-
gation of the jurisdictional facts by a civil court in a habeas
corpus proceeding. The effect of avoidance of a discharge is
to reinstate the military status and the unexecuted portion
of the contract of enlistment. Obviously, a speedy determina-
tion is required, but the remedy is a problem for Congress,
not for the Executive. 188
G. Conclusions
1. The jurisdiction of naval courts martial over spies,
bringers of seducing enemy messages, and those who endeav-
or to corrupt naval personnel to betray their trust, con-
ferred by AGN 5, is constitutional because (a) the guaranty
of a jury trial does not apply to offenders against the law of
war, (b) the offenses specified are violations of the law of
war, (c) the instrument of courts martial is reasonably
adapted to the trial of such offenses, and (d) Congress has
expressly conferred such jurisdiction.
2. Jurisdiction of naval courts martial over persons ac-
companying or serving with naval forces in time of war or
national emergency, beyond the reach of the federal courts,
1 82 Such a requirement is made in the statute conferring upon courts martial
jurisdiction over a dismissed officer who applies for trial. His trial is limited to
the offenses for which he had been dismissed. AGN 37. The same requirement in
all cases of undetermined status would seem necessary to a compliance with due
process See -Snedeker, Developments in the Law of Naval Justice, 23 NoTRE DAaM
LAWYER 1, 16-17 (1947).
188 For suggested solutions, see notes 144 and 170 supra.
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conferred by the Act of March 22, 1943, is constitutional be-
cause (a) the guaranty of a jury trial does not apply to such
persons in such places, (b) there is no denial of due process
in properly conducted court-martial proceedings, (c) the
subjection of such persons to courts martial is necessary and
proper to prevent their unlawful acts from going unpunished
and to preserve military security, (d) there are no other re-
strictions upon the power of Congress to so legislate, and (e)
Congress has so legislated.
3. Jurisdiction of naval courts martial over persons who,
as officers, were dismissed by order of the President in time
of war is constitutional because (a) it is conditional upon
the voluntary application of such persons for trial by court
martial, (b) such an application legally constitutes a waiver
of the right to trial by jury and a revival of their obligation
to and connection with the naval forces, (c) the only impedi-
ment to the existence of the power of Congress to subject
them to court-martial jurisdiction is thereby removed, and
(d) Congress has exercised that power.
4. Jurisdiction of naval courts martial over uncondition-
ally discharged and dismissed persons whose connection with
the naval service has ceased, and who are subsequently
charged with a pecuniary fraud against the United States
committed while in the naval service could be constitution-
ally conferred by Congress provided it was restricted to those
persons who are beyond the boundaries of continental United
States and of its organized Territories when so charged and
tried because (a) such persons are beyond the territorial
scope of the guaranty of a jury trial, (b) there is no denial of
due process in properly condacted court-martial proceedings,
(c) the subjection of such persons to courts martial is neces-
sary and proper to prevent their unlawful acts from going
unpunished, and (d) there are no other restrictions upon the
power of Congress to so legislate. Jurisdiction extending to
such persons who are within the boundaries of continental
United States or of its organized Territories when so charged
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and tried could not be constitutionally conferred because (a)
they are not, in fact, persons in, connected with, or obligated
to the land or naval forces, (b) the use of courts martial to
try ex-servicemen for offenses against the Federal Code is un-
necessary, and (c) the guaranty of a jury trial applies to
them. The jurisdiction attempted to be conferred on naval
courts martial by the eleventh paragraph of AGN 14 (and
upon Army courts martial by AW 94) includes both the con-
stitutional and unconstitutional aspects. The provision is
penal in nature, is not separable into parts, and no reason-
able interpretation of its language can produce the required
limitation. The provision must therefore fail in its en-
tirety. 1
4
5. Jurisdiction of naval courts martial over uncondition-
ally discharged persons whose connection with the naval serv-
ice has ceased, and who are subsequently charged with hav-
ing obtained their discharges by fraudulent means does not
exist because (a) such a discharge has the effect of changing
status from naval to civilian, (b) the only civilians amenable
to naval courts martial under existing valid law are officers
dismissed by the President who demand trial, those persons
accompanying or serving with naval forces, and certain
offenders against the law of war, whereas the discharged per-
sons here dealt with are neither dismissed officers, nor accom-
panying or serving, nor offenders against the law of war, (c)
the discharges, although voidable on the ground of fraud in
the inducement, have not been avoided by constitutional ju-
dicial action, and (d) Congress has not yet conferred juris-
diction over such persons upon naval courts martial.
James Snedeker
184 The interpolation, by way of interpretation, of words of limitation into a
federal act penal in nature which as an entirety is invalid as to part of its possible
applications would create the spectre of judicial legislation, and is not within the
judicial province. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1876);
Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550 (1879); Chicago, M. & St. Paul
R Co. v. Westby, 178 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 8th 1910); Butts v. Merchants & Miners
Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126, 33 S. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed. 1422 (1913); 2 SuTH-
ErLaD, STATUTORY CoNsTrrTioN § 2413, 2414, 2416 (3rd ed. 1943).
